Listening to the Social World of the Child: A Phenomenological Proposal

Introduction

The ongoing issue of how to “listen to children” has been a persistent concern in social research on children and childhood, and has also been somewhat related to the phenomenon known as “children’s participation” (e.g., Komulainen, 2007; Lundy and McEvoy, 2011; Mannion, 2007; Spyrou, 2011; Sundhall, 2012; Twum-Danso Imoh and Okyere, 2020; Wyness, 2016). The relationship between listening to children and children’s participation is not only covered within childhood studies or children’s rights research, but is also to some extent included in the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC, 1989). However, in Article 12 of the UNCRC, children’s participation is expressed as the state’s responsibility to “assure to the child who is capable of forming his or her own views the right to express those views freely”. Nevertheless, these views are also supposed to be “given due weight in accordance with the age and maturity of the child” (UNCRC, see, for example, CRC/C/GC/12 2009, No. 15 and 28). On this point, Lee (1998, p. 457) once stated that “in the light of considerations of age and maturity the Article remains ambivalent about children’s ability to represent themselves, and thus ambivalent about their place in decision-making.” This ambiguity regarding children’s place in decision-making is, what Lee (1999) calls it, distributed to those who are supposed to listen to children, whereas children’s participation becomes a relational issue between the world of the child and the world of the adult.

The relationality of children’s participation has been acknowledged in the additional comments in Article 12 (CRC/C/GC/12 2009, No. 3; see Blaisdell et al., 2021). There, participation is mentioned as “ongoing processes” that, through dialogue and mutual respect between children and adults, should clarify how both children’s and adults’ views are considered and where both views should “shape the outcome of such processes” (CRC/C/GC/12 2009, No. 3). However, within the still-emerging field of childhood studies, researchers have argued that the relational aspects of not only children’s rights (e.g., Wall, 2008, 2010) but also childhood in general need to be put forward (e.g., Spyrou, Rosen and Cook, 2019). Traditional views on concepts such as maturity and agency seem to imply the necessity of assessing children’s competencies and characteristics, but such assessments might in themselves turn into obstacles, consequently silencing children’s voices (e.g., Birnbaum and Saini, 2012; Eriksson and Näsman, 2009; Facca, Gladstone and Teachman, 2020; Holmqvist, 2019; Mattsson, 2008; Spyrou, 2019; Sundhall, 2012; Wall, 2010). According to Tisdall (2015), this silencing of children’s voices is due to the difficulties of inserting ideas of children’s participation into systems that are already fundamentally adult-oriented. This adult-orientedness within research, policy and practice becomes particularly clear when children are regarded as unable to reach agentic ideals or express something that challenges normative views within the adult world (cf. Tisdall, 2016, p. 365). In other words, we seem to be faced with different adult conceptions of the meaning of children’s participation, conceptions which in themselves appear to complicate the implementation of participation, or at least, as Tisdall (2015, p. 192) remarks, give it an “uneven impact on decisions.” What if we were to try to bracket those adult conceptions and instead move towards the meaning of participation and its relatedness to listening to children as experienced within the world of the child? What would that bring to the table?

In this article, our aim is to explore the phenomenon of children’s participation and how it relates to listening to the social world of the child, in the sense of seeking to understand the lived experience of the phenomenon within an interpersonal context. In the context of childhood research, the difference between the so-called “children’s perspective” (i.e., children’s own perspective) and “a child perspective” (i.e., as understood by adults) has been highlighted as an important distinction. However, the “child perspective” has been criticized for losing its analytical sharpness because of its vague definition (Halldén, 2003; see also Skivenes and Strandbu, 2006; Zetterqvist Nelson, 2012). Johansson (2003) has earlier pointed out the connection between “the children’s perspective” and its relevance to phenomenological inquiry in the context of research and education. Johansson equates perspectives with phenomenological lifeworlds, whereas we suggest using the term “world” in relation to the phenomenon of children’s participation. We believe the use of “world” allows for a more complex understanding of the relevance structures of multiple social worlds, while also avoiding the risk of regarding perspectives as something inherent within the subject, as phenomenology seeks a return to what makes these perspectives possible in the first place. The everyday lifeworld was described by Schütz (1962) as inhabiting many different types of worlds, each constituted by its own unique relevance structure. The relevance structure was described by Schütz as a province of meaning constituting what is socially relevant in a particular world. Following phenomenological reasoning, relevance structures are often taken for granted within the social world to which they belong but could be disclosed following critical reflection. From such a phenomenological stance, the adult (professional) world might not readily understand the meaning of children’s participation in how this phenomenon is constituted within the world of the child. It seems reasonable then to propose a phenomenological approach to listening to the world of the child, in order to disclose the phenomenon of children’s participation.

We will use excerpts from an ongoing empirical study being conducted in Sweden that explores social relations during family law proceedings within the narrative of the world of the child.¹ The excerpts are meant to exemplify how it is possible to listen to the world of the child and to the meaning of children’s participation, specifically focusing on how social relations become relevant within the world of the child. By proposing a phenomenological approach, as well as taking Lipari’s (2010) theoretical work on listening as our point of departure, we wish to emphasize the difference between “hearing” and “listening”, as this is helpful when it comes to understanding not only what constitutes listening but also the meaning of participation and being open to the world of the other. Moreover, we draw on a phenomenological understanding of the family law proceeding as living through a social situation, where sociality is acknowledged. However, at this point it is important to stress that it is not within the scope of this article to suggest practical methods for listening to children’s views. Rather, the exploration is meant as a theoretical contribution to how one can listen to the world of the child. In the following, we will begin with the phenomenological proposal in relation to some themes within current research literature on children’s participation and discuss how this proposal relates to listening to children within family law proceedings.

Proposing the use of a phenomenological approach

The phenomenology of the social world was originally explicated by Schütz (1962, 1967). Even though terms such as “provinces of meaning” are used by Schütz, the concept of world does not formally refer to a physical area (as in geography), but to a structure of relevance constituted by meaning. This means that a world is also accessible through one’s imagination and memory: intentional acts that also allow for going from one world to the other. Nevertheless, the concept of a world does not refer to something esoteric or mystical but is something that we all refer to in everyday life, as in the business world, the world of science, the world of old age, the world of dreams, and so forth. As Guenther (2020, p. 11) puts it, “phenomenology gives us a language to articulate the relationships without which we could not be who we are or understand what we experience.” To use an everyday example, the relevance structure of the professional world, as in attending a professional meeting, is different from the relevance structure of the world of leisure, as in “hanging out” with close friends. In other words, intersubjectivity provides for the possibility of the constitutive process of any relevance structure of a social world.

Following a phenomenological approach to listening, Lipari’s (2010) theoretical work could be helpful, since she regards listening as an act focused on the other, as opposed to a focus on our own experience in the act of hearing. Such an account of listening implies that you can hear without listening, but you cannot listen without hearing. Additionally, Lipari (ibid) points to the fact that when we listen, we should not try to categorize what we are listening to or base our listening on what we already know. Instead, we should be attentive and present to what is being expressed. Hence, Lipari’s point seems similar to how a phenomenologist would seek to understand the social world of others, that is, by being open to a discovery of how expression relates to the social world of the other, by describing how meanings are context-dependent (Schütz, 1962; Throop, 2018).² Such a type of listening could help us to avoid oversimplification, something that has also been advocated by childhood and children’s rights theorists (e.g., Eldén, 2012; Komulainen, 2007; Quennerstedt, 2013; Spyrou, 2011; Sundhall, 2012; Wall, 2019), and enable us to stand outside conformity (e.g., Lipari, 2010). A phenomenological approach to listening to the social world of the child can allow us to participate in what is complicated or ambiguous, in an attempt, as Schütz (1962) once pointed out, to understand a particular world from its own unique structure of relevance. Perhaps such an approach, of being open to the social world (cf. Throop, 2018) and following the expression of the child within its own world of social relationships, would lead us to understand how to listen to the world of the child, while also acknowledging the child as at times being existentially thrown-into a situation (e.g., family law proceedings) constituted in the world of the adult. To be able to acknowledge and listen to the social world of the child, we would have to focus on social, interpersonal relations as something that is experienced in the context of the world of the child.

Thus, a phenomenological approach to listening to children seeks the meaning of an expression within a given situation and from the interpersonal context of the social world of the child. Such an approach would also be congruent with the existential-phenomenological philosopher Merleau-Ponty’s (2010: p. 142, 374) work from the mid 20th century, in which he sought an understanding of the child that went beyond the conceptions and theories of the adult world. He saw the contemporary conceptions and theories of the adult as depicting the child as an adult in miniature, something unfinished, which amounts to depriving the world and consciousness of the child of its own holistic structure. The proposal of a phenomenological approach, especially through Merleau-Ponty, aligns with other emerging understandings of participation within childhood studies, where it is seen as embedded in children’s “everyday lives” and embodied rather than rational (e.g., Wyness, 2016). At the same time, the approach of listening to children should not be mistaken for a search for “authenticity”, a search questioned within some childhood studies (cf. Komulainen, 2007 Spyrou, 2011; Tingstad, 2019). Phenomenology could rather be a contribution to finding a way to transcend the problem of “authenticity” (cf. Hammersley, 2017; Tingstad, 2019; Tisdall, 2016; Wyness, 2016), as well as the problem of “voice” (cf. Komulainen, 2007; Spyrou, 2011; Sundhall, 2012; Twum-Danso Imoh and Okyere, 2020). Twum-Danso Imoh and Okyere (2020, p. 1), for instance, argue for a practice that is “more holistic, inclusive and aligned with the meanings that children themselves attach to their everyday lives as well as to the key personal and social relationships that they value.” Instead of basing children’s rights on traditional concepts of agency and autonomy, a phenomenological approach is ethically congruent with the relational turn in childhood studies, where rights are seen as an expression of the mutual interdependence and responsibility of humans (e.g., Holmqvist, 2019; Mannion, 2007; Spyrou, 2011; Spyrou, Rosen and Cook, 2019; Sundhall, 2012; Wall, 2019).³ As Schütz (1962) has pointed out, to awaken our doubt is to bracket what we take for granted. It is suggested here that attentiveness should be directed towards the meaning as it presents itself when one listens, as the voice alone can never be considered sufficient in understanding the child. In other words, the voice of the child cannot be seen as something in itself. Any type of expression needs to be seen in its interdependent relation to the relevance structure of the social world – as meanings are context-dependent.

However, seeking to understand the world of the child does not make matters any easier. Sadowski and McIntosh (2015) have provided us with an example of complex insights that could be difficult to comprehend or utilize for the adult world. In their qualitative phenomenological study on children’s views of shared-time parenting arrangements after a divorce, it became clear that what was important for children to feel psychologically secure was their parents’ ability to provide a sense of shared emotional space, rather than equally shared time. Also, Smart (2002) has shown that what was experienced as being vital for children within custody disputes was the way in which their relationships were sustained and managed. Such findings might be difficult for professionals and parents to tackle because, within the context of post-divorce parenthood, it seems easier to manage children’s time or other more concrete matters than relationships and emotional states. Smart (2002) concluded that a genuine devotion to listening to children could imply higher ethical demands, since it is more difficult to find solutions that also show the child sufficient respect. Furthermore, listening need not be limited to, for example, the child’s view within family law proceedings, or to the situatedness within family relations, or even to the individual experiences of such relations. Listening might instead be an attentiveness to the whole situation, including the historical situatedness of the multiple worlds involved, which, in turn, includes structural inequalities and othering (cf. Knezevic, 2020). As such, we could reach for deeper insights into what children’s participation might mean.

Listening to experiences of participation within the social world of the child

The examples⁴ presented below indicate a specific purpose in which the researcher listens to the research participant’s lived experience of their interpersonal relations (as in a focus on the social world) as it was remembered being lived through during the time of the family law proceedings. The excerpts presented are part of a qualitative phenomenological study on “children’s participation” in the context of family law proceedings. Hence, we are dealing with how to listen to meanings within a world in research interviews, which indicates a focus on past experiences. Following the phenomenological approach to interviewing in qualitative research (Churchill, 2022; Englander, 2020),⁵ the focus of the qualitative interview is to listen to meanings constituted within the lived experience of a phenomenon in the context of a life situation within a social world. The fundamental selection criterion to participate in a phenomenological qualitative study is to have had an experience of the phenomenon (Churchill, 2022), although specific criteria depend on research design (Englander, 2020). In regard to the research design of the study from which the examples were drawn, the selection criterion of having been a child (as in the formal age of a child) during the formal process of the family law proceedings (i.e., the situation) was crucial. Nevertheless, the interviews were conducted four years after the formal process of the family law proceedings, which meant that some of the research participants had, at the time of the interviews, passed the legal age of being a child. A reasonable age and time limit was thus considered so that the participants could provide the researcher with rich qualitative research material. We have chosen excerpts from interviews with two participants, who we have named “Nicole” and “Seyma”. The participants have been found through verdicts in three different regional courts, where they, on their own or through their parents, have communicated interest in participating in the specific study. Purposely, the excerpts we use concern the meaning of children’s participation as it relates to listening.

Conclusion

We have tried to show how listening to the interpersonal context of the social world of the child could disclose rather ambiguous and complex experiences of what it means to participate within the situation of family law proceedings. By regarding participation in such a situation as something more than just adults inviting children to be involved in the assessment and instead acknowledging children’s active social part within the family, we see an opportunity to transcend the meaning of the adult conception of children’s participation.

We regard our proposal for attentive listening, in a quest to be open to the social world of the child, as a way to avoid what is taken for granted in the traditional adult meaning of participation (cf. Haldar and Engebretsen, 2014; Komulainen, 2007; Spyrou, 2011; van Bijleveld, Dedding and Bunders-Aelen, 2015). We do, however, avoid interpretations of the voice and expressions such as “authentic,” which risk being understood as meaning something one-dimensional and individualistic. Instead, we have addressed the possibility to listen, that is, to be attentive and open to the social world of the child and the child’s interpersonal relations. As our examples have clearly shown, we acknowledge participation, in the sense of an ongoing relational process between children and adults, as something that is already taking place, whether professionals are involved or not. We therefore suggest that the meaning of participation must begin with an understanding of the social world of the child. At the same time, the active involvement of professionals brings something more to the phenomenon, in which the distinction between hearing and listening seems crucial, as in not letting the professional adult sense of children’s participation cause greater distress for the children involved in the processes of family law proceedings.

The phenomenological approach gives us an opportunity to address some of the different meanings that a phenomenon such as children’s participation might have in different social worlds, due to the different relevance structures that are involved in these worlds. Also, it highlights the relationality of those worlds, to what is socially (including historically) inherent and intersubjectively constituted. However, when one is open to the world of others, matters seem to become more complicated and ambiguous, which demands more of the person who is listening. It includes a sense of responsibility of not only listening to children’s views and what they say about their situation, but also demands a critical reflection on what one takes for granted in the adult world and how it relates to the world of the child. To reflect on what is taken for granted is not something that is easily done, nor is taking measures for what such reflections might make one aware of, but it may be what is required for change to be possible.